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Abstract 
The public sector in  European countries has  been swept up  in general 
economic  restructuring.  This  has  had  a marked  impact  on  many 
aspects of  industrial relations and personnel management in the public 
sector.  In  most countries,  the growth of public employment has  been 
slowed,  while  structures  of  bargaining,  pay  determination,  job 
classification,  career  structures  and  so  on  have  been  the  subject  of 
reform projects.  In Belgium, there is one constant which keeps turning 
up  in  all  reform  projects:  doubt  concerning  the  tenability  of the 
principle  of statutory  employment.  In  the  present  work  we  will 
attempt  to  lay  bare  the  core  of the  debate  concerning  the future  of 
statutory employment. 
Introduction 
Governments intervene in industrial relations in many ways, and thus influence 
these  relations  to  quite  a  large  extent.  Hence,  differences  between national 
systems of industrial relations can partly be related to the types of government 
intervention found in the various countries (Van Waarden, 1995).  It is important 
to note, however, that the government also acts as a direct negotiating party.  Each 
government  has  to  deal  with  organisations  representing  its  employees:  civil 
servants, employees working in the subsidised sectors and those working in state-
owned companies.  Several  governments  have  even  tried  through  their  own 
employment policies to set an example for private employers (Beaumont, 1981). 
The public sector in European countries has been swept up in general economic 
restructuring.  This has had a marked impact on many aspects of industrial rela-
tions and personnel management in the public sector (Ferner, 1994).  In most coun-
tries,  the  growth of public employment has been slowed,  while  structures  of 
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been the subject of reform projects (OEeD, 1995).  In Belgium, there is one constant 
which keeps turning up in all reform projects: doubt concerning the tenability of 
the principle of statutory employment.  In the present work we will attempt to lay 
bare the core of the debate concerning the future of statutory employment 2.  This 
will be done in five steps. 
1.  Statute and  contract: functional  equivalents.  Firstly, we point out the differences 
between statutory and contractual employment.  The statutory appointment is 
the usual manner of regulating the employment relationship  in the Belgian 
public sector. 
2.  The  problem: fossilisation  of internal markets.  The principal criticisms of statutory 
employment are set forth in the second section.  The main point is  that the 
statutory rules increase the rigidity of the intemallabour market. 
3.  The  remedy:  decentralisation.  An  accelerated  decentralisation  of  collective 
bargaining is taking place in the Belgian public sector.  Decentralised regulation 
is  meant to  enable the creation of custom-designed statutes for  the various 
segments of the public sector.  We outline the process as it is taking place in the 
sector of the state enterprises. 
4.  The  loophole: subsidiarisation.  Although decentralisation already enables greater 
differentiation in the personnel statutes, most public managers have their sights 
set on employment by contract.  It is particularly because of the processes of 
'subsidiarisation'  that  increasing  numbers  of  personnel  are  seeing  their 
employment relationship contractualised. 
5.  The  alternative: a flexibility  debate.  In the concluding section, we argue that the 
controversy about 'statute versus contract' should make way for a serene debate 
on the proper degree of functional and numerical flexibility within the various 
segments of the public sector. 
1.  Functional equivalents, different effects 
The term 'employment relationship' can be traced in the English-language litera-
ture to such authors as Fox (1974), Littler (1982), Barbash (1984)  and Williamson 
(1985).  The term refers to the conditions under which an employer decides to pay 
for the labour of an employee and under which this employee decides to sell his 
labour to the employer in question.  Under these conditions, the employer expects 
A  previous version of this paper was presented at the IREC Conference 1996  on 'Industrial 
Relations in Europe: Convergence or Diversification?', FAOS, University of Copenhagen. 
2 an overall orientation in conformity with the formal action-related expectations in 
force in the organisation (Luhmann, 1972). 
In the private sector, the employment relationship  is  partly concretised in a 
labour contract  between employee and  employer  (Huiskamp,  1995).  Men and 
women become members of the organisation by signing a contract whereby the 
employee promises the employer to obey his orders, to work under his control 
and to follow his instructions.  The employer promises to  reward the services 
rendered in accordance with the principles laid down in the contract.  The funda-
mental  principle  of  employment by  contract  is  the  possibility  of  negotiation 
concerning the provisions to be written into the contract.  Whereas, in the private 
sector, the relationship between employee and employer arises after the signature 
of the contract, in the Belgian public sector this is often governed by a statute.  The 
statute can be described as a regulation of the relationship between the govern-
ment and its employees, as established by general administrative order (Janvier 
and Rigaux, 1987). 
Various details concerning the importance of statutory employment in different 
branches of the public sector are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Percentage of personnel employed under a statute versus employed by contract (1995) 
Employees  Statutory  Contractual 
Federal Government Ministries 
1  59.432  78.6  21.4 
Ministries of Communities and Regions 1  25.133  76.4  23.6 
Local Authorities and Provinces 
1  244.729  55.0  45.0 
Education Flemish Community  2  131.982  80.8  19.2 
National public interest bodies 
1  21.192  65.8  34.2 
Public interest bodies Communities/Regions 
1  30.440  58.6  41.4 
Post Office 3  46.597  90.1  9.9 
Belgacom (parent company) 4  24.908  90.0  10.0 
Railway company (parent company) 5  41.891  97.9  2.1 
Source:  1 'Apen;u des effectifs du secteur public', Ministry of the Interior and the Public Service 
2 'Statistisch Jaarboek van het Vlaams Onderwijs', Ministry of the Flemish Community 
3  Annual Report 1995 of the Post Office 
4 Annual Report 1995 of Belgacom 
5 Annual Report 1995 of NMBS/SNCB 
Statute and contract are functional  equivalents.  Both contribute to the solution of 
the  same  problem:  the  stabilisation  of  mutual  expectations  of  employer  and 
employee (Luhmann, 1972, 1992).  The elements that make up the labour contract, 
in other words the performance of work in return for a wage under the authority 
of an employer, are also present in the statutory employment.  Subordination to an 
employer is common to both systems.  Whereas subordination in the private sector 
3 has a contractual basis, it generally ensues from entering into a statutory regula-
tion in the public sector.  Moreover, it is important to note that, in the private as 
well as  in the public sector, the employment relationship covers a  field  much 
wider than does the individual labour contract (private) or the personnel statute 
(public).  Only part of the employment relationship is written down in the contract 
or the statute.  Statutory or contractually regulated, the employment relationship 
is given shape in a permanent system of negotiation, since under modern condi-
tions  of economic action under uncertainty the precise nature of the activities 
required by the employer in the future cannot be known at the time of concluding 
the  contract or entering  a  statutory  regulation  (Barnard,  1950;  Barbash,  1984; 
Streeck, 1992). 
As  well  as  functional  equivalencies  and  similarities,  there  are  also  many 
differences between statute and contract.  The major difference between these two 
techniques of regulating the employment relationship rests in the fact that, in case 
of statutory employment, the government can unilaterally determine the terms 
and conditions of employment.  The 'principle of variability' implies specifically 
that the personnel statute must be capable of being unilaterally adapted to the 
'ever-changing requirements of the  general  interest'  (Deom,  1990).  The  legal 
regulation of the employment relationship in the public sector is therefore not, in 
principle, open to negotiation.  Although public authorities are obliged to bargain, 
they are not legally bound by the outcome (Vilrokx and Van Leemput, 1992). 
Whereas the contractual relationship is (in theory) a coming together of free wills 3, 
the statutory appointment is best described as the entry into a general regulation, 
or as the 'subordination of the individual will to the general interest'. 
The most striking difference concerns the security of employment.  The private-
sector employer enjoys de facto the power of dismissal.  True, this right is limited 
to some extent by employment protection measures, but no employer can be made 
to continue to employ a person he wishes to dismiss.  Personnel employed under a 
statute  can  only be  dismissed  in certain  exhaustively  described  cases.  This 
principle forms the basis of security of employment.  The most important function 
of this employment security is that of providing a legal guarantee against arbitrary 
dismissal or relocation.  Security of employment must protect the public servant 
against political capriciousness and give him the necessary independence to use 
In  spite  of  the  voluntary  agreement  principle  of  contract,  the  entrepreneurial  right  of 
management (essential to the utilization of labour as a commodity), implies a continuous one-
sided  redefinition  of  the  employee's  duties  of  performance by  the  employer.  The  fully 
developed labour contract is an unequal contract insofar as it contractually specifies the rights 
of the employee and the obligations of the employer, while the rights of the employer and the 
obligations of the employee remain in principle 'open', that is 'diffuse' and status-like (Streeck, 
1992). 
4 his expertise to the full.  In this sense, it guarantees continuity of authority (Weber, 
1978).  It is precisely the instability of politics which justifies the stability of the 
civil service. 
A second function of statutory employment security is much less obvious.  One 
essential feature of organised social systems is that membership can be terminated. 
Rebellious behaviour frequently leads to dismissaL  The threat of dismissal is an 
instrument of power  for  the  organisation  (Luhmann,  1979,  1991).  However, 
members can also decide to take action themselves.  They can decide to leave.  The 
finite nature of membership therefore also implies risks for the organisation, in 
that it threatens its stability and continuity.  In situations where members are 
tempted to leave the organisation or during periods when there are sufficient 
alternatives  (e.g.  labour  market  shortage),  organisations  will  need  structures 
which block the 'exit' tendency and make them less dependent on their members 
when changing  their  rules  (DiPrete,  1993;  Hirschman,  1970;  Luhmann,  1975). 
Government  bureaucracies  have  therefore  turned  their  doors  into  fishnets. 
Members can get in but, once inside, find it hard to get out. After all, personnel 
employed  under a  statute cannot  resign  except  in  a  number of exhaustively 
described cases.  This must permit government unilaterally to impose and amend 
measures affecting its employees, without provoking them into a mass exodus. 
Another major difference between statute and contract is the statutory post system. 
In the public sector, applicants are usually exclusively recruited for one specific post. 
Moreover, statutory personnel is appointed into a grade corresponding to a certain 
rank.  The rank indicates the relative value of the grade at that level.  The level 
reflects a certain level of educational achievement.  Employment under a statute also 
goes hand in hand with the statutory career system.  The statutory career enables the 
public  servants  to  rise  through  a  succession  of  hierarchically  defined  posts 
(Hondeghem, 1990).  The possible career movements are nearly completely pre-
programmed in statutory regulations.  This constitutes a significant difference with 
employment based on a labour contract.  Whereas labour contracts seldom include 
any provisions concerning the future internal career, such provisions are statutorily 
regulated in the public sector.  The private employer therefore enjoys a much greater 
freedom in developing his promotional policy. 
2.  The problem: fossilisation of internal markets 
The extreme stability of employment and the statutory post and career systems 
result  in  most  state-owned  organisations  having  highly  closed  internal  labour 
markets.  Internal labour markets are described here as job systems: 
5 - where the allocation of the work force  and pricing are subject to one single 
administrative regime; 
- which are arranged in hierarchical structures; 
- where internal promotion is more important than external recruitment for the 
filling of vacancies; 
- where the remuneration ratios between the respective jobs are isolated from 
direct price competition from outsiders (Glebbeek, 1993). 
Internal labour markets can fulfil  various functions in both the private and the 
public sector.  The most important of these are: 
a  Stabilisation function.  Especially in the private sector the relative freedom of the 
labour contract translates into uncertainty for  employers concerning the cost-
effectiveness of possible investments in the skills of their employees (Streeck, 
1989).  The risk inherent in substantial training investments is that employees 
will leave and take the training investment with them.  Internal labour market 
structures  that  create  incentives  to  remain  are  a  solution  to  this  problem 
(Osterman,1995).  Labour market theorists claim that the prospects of employ-
ment stability and sponsored career mobility via firm-specific internal labour 
markets  reduce  turnover,  especially  in  large  bureaucratic  organisations 
(Althauser, 1989; Baron and Bielby, 1980). 
b  Development function.  Internal markets often grow up around jobs for which 
company-specific skills are needed.  These skills are more difficult to 'turn into 
money' (Oosterhuis, 1992).  Employees thus have an interest in continuing the 
employment  relationship.  The  employer  wrestles  with  the  problem  that 
company-specific skills  are not available  off-the-peg on the labour market. 
Internal markets have an important function  in this connection,  since  they 
make a supervised development of skills possible (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). 
Career profiles can then be planned so as to produce a progressive multiplica-
tion of skills as more rungs are climbed up the ladder. 
c  Buffer function.  Internal markets make organisations less  dependent on the 
external labour market.  If skill requirements change, it is no longer necessary 
to wait until these skills become available on the external market.  The internal 
market thus becomes a safeguard against imbalances which cannot be reme-
died in the short term by the external market - a buffer which can reveal its 
advantages at times of organisational changes. 
d  Motivation function. The prospect of a career can provide motivation, so long as 
the criteria applied are sufficiently transparent, employees have the impression 
that selection decisions are made on the basis of objective standards, they are 
6 convinced that 'equal candidates' also have equal opportunities and that they 
see a clear link between achievement and promotion (Luhmann and Mayntz, 
1973).  Under these conditions, the internal market is a reliable, efficient and 
affordable motivation mechanism. 
e  Selection  function.  Thanks  to  its  internal market,  the  organisation supplies 
candidates for higher in-house positions (Cappelli, 1995).  The organisation has 
the time to test its members over longer periods. 
f  Legitimisation function.  Authority structures are effective in organisations only 
if the organisation's members consider them legitimate.  If the authoritative 
positions in the organisation are, in theory, open to a large group of members 
and if the rules of the promotion game are clear, the legitimacy of the authority 
structure will probably increase. 
At first sight, internal markets offer mainly advantages.  Yet discordant noises can 
be heard in most public sector employing organisations.  A number of mechanisms 
of the internal labour market are the actual objects of criticism.  The stabilisation 
function  is  the most  debated.  Employment security  and  internal  careers  were 
deliberately introduced into the personnel statutes for  their supposed stabilising 
effect.  It was thought that the continuity of the operation of the State and the 
changeability  of  its  institutions  would  benefit  from  a  reduction  of  the  'exit' 
alternatives.  But  what was  once  hailed  as  a  condition  for  changeability  and 
continuity is now looked upon as a 'ball and chain' (Van de Velde, 1992).  Many 
public  organisations  wishing  to  streamline  run up  against  the  rigidity  of  the 
relationship  with their  personneL  The  principle  of statutory  employment  has 
therefore radically changed its objective: conceived to help government operational 
conditions adapt flexibly to the changing requirements of the general interest, it has 
become a system of rights which is seen as an obstacle to change. 
The development function  has also come in for criticism.  The statutory career 
system that controls the traffic in the interTlal market is apparently unable to offer 
sufficient guarantees for an adequate dovetailing of the internally available with 
the required skills.  Whether a career system offers any meaningful assistance in 
perfecting the balance between required and available skills depends on a number 
of conditions.  First, these skills must be capable of being adequately objectified. 
Otherwise, it becomes more tempting to apply extrafunctional criteria which are 
not linked to  competence or performance.  Secondly, it should be possible to 
examine each position to see whether internal recruitment via the career system 
can provide  better  guarantees  than  external  recruitment  of  finding  the  right 
person  for  the  job.  Moreover,  the  selection  criteria  applied  must,  first  and 
foremost,  assess  the suitability of the candidates for  the vacant posts.  Finally, 
7 available and required skills must be regularly matched so as not to give problems 
of balance the time to develop (Hondeghem, 1990; Mayntz, 1973). 
The conventional statutory career system in the public sector does not satisfy 
most of these conditions.  Competition is institutionalised in statutory seniority 
systems.  The great weight of the seniority criterion in the pre-selection of candi-
dates for promotion impedes the matching of available and required skills.  The 
evaluation of performance or competence plays a negligible part in this pre-selec-
tion.  The  conventional  evaluation  system  is  failing  in  its  main  function 
- differentiating between 'good enough' and not 'good enough' - since in most 
public services, the vast majority of the employees (up to 95%)  receives the most 
favourable evaluation score (Sels,  1996).  So  past failures are forgiven and past 
successes forgotten.  In addition, careers are rigidly pre-programmed into statu-
tory career lines.  The possible access grades are stipulated for each grade.  The 
speed at which the rungs on the ladder can be climbed is largely predetermined. 
Careers  follow  fixed  paths  and  set  routes.  This  high  degree  of  career  pre-
programming also results in a rather long waiting period before promotion to a 
position  with  real  responsibility.  This  can  impair  innovation  capacity 
(Hondeghem, 1994; Sels, 1996).  Moreover, since the evaluation system is failing in 
differentiating between employees, the link between promotion and achievement 
is too loose to have an incentive effect.  This means that the motivation function of 
the internal market is also negligible.  This also applies to the buffer and the selec-
tion functions.  The internal markets are seen as too closed.  For far too many of the 
posts, external applications are not accepted.  This is perceived as an undesirable 
restriction on the pool of available talent. 
3.  The remedy: decentralisation 
With the passing of time, the rules which regulate the traffic in the internal labour 
market can become rigid (Lutz, 1987; Fruytier, 1994).  This problem is not peculiar to 
the  public  sector.  In earlier  research  into  the  degree  of  dissemination  of new 
production concepts in the automobile, the chemical and the machine-tool indus-
tries, we pointed out comparable processes as  factors  which explain in part 'the 
delayed transformation'  in trade and industry  (Huys, Sels  and Van Hootegem, 
1995).  In most Belgian state-owned organisations, however, the internal labour 
markets are characterised by an extreme rigidity.  This can in part be explained on 
the basis of the fact that nearly all aspects of the employment relationship have with 
the  passing  of  time  been  formalised  in  statutory  regulations.  The  statutory 
employment can be described as a highly specified and restrictive way of regu-
lating  the  employment relationship  (Watson,  1987).  Consequently,  personnel 
8 responsibilities  remain limited within the narrow area of ensuring compliance 
with detailed and prescriptive procedures. 
Having researched the failure of reorganisation plans in Belgian state companies 
for some years now, we can state that this excessive formalisation is an obstacle to 
the redesign of the production and work organisation (Sels,  1996).  Superficial 
operations which leave the general architecture undisturbed do not address these 
obstacles.  In such cases, formalisation is  even functional, in the sense that the 
work  force  is  more  amenable  to  changes  at  work  if  the  conditions  of  their 
membership are guaranteed.  However, once the step is taken from cosmetics to 
corrective  surgery  in the  organisational  structure,  the  full  restrictive  force  of 
formalisation via statute is revealed. 
Next to this excessive formalisation is the strong homogeneity of the different 
personnel statutes also object to criticism.  The cornerstones of the civil servants 
statute are to be found in the statutory regulations for the local sector, state-owned 
companies and even education. This homogeneity would be squarely opposed to 
the  heterogeneity  of the  public  sector  (Pirlot,  1989).  There  are  many  public 
authorities,  each including several  employers.  Therefore,  the  call  for  greater 
differentiation in personnel statutes grows louder.  Decentralisation of collective 
bargaining is thought to be a way of achieving this goal (Brynaert, 1994; Damar, 
1992). 
This is  a curious turn of events.  During the mid-80s, various commentators 
forecast such decentralisation of collective bargaining taking place mostly in the 
private sector:  a  system with less binding arrangements at sectoral or national 
level, allocating a broader role to consultation at company level (Blanpain, 1984). 
So far, the prediction has not come true, which may in part be ascribed to a major 
error of analysis: failure to recognise the advantages that employers, too, can gain 
from central consultation.  The most important benefit is the avoidance of snowball 
effects (the 'trade union domino strategy'): high wage increases in some companies 
triggering increases in others.  A second benefit is that at that level central govern-
ment can more easily be moved to intervene.  A third benefit for  the individual 
employer is that the trade union can more easily be kept away from the shop floor. 
The mid-80s also saw sectoral negotiations acquire an additional function: taking up 
slack in the labour market.  The sectors felt an increasing need for a sectoral labour 
market and training policy. 
Anyone wanting to observe the process of decentralisation in Belgium should 
not therefore look to the private sector.  In the public sector, by contrast, decen-
tralisation is  used  to break down the contested  homogeneity of the statutory 
regulations.  Decentralisation is leading to a  growing differentiation in the terms 
and conditions of employment in the different branches of the public sector (Vilrokx 
and Van Leemput, 1992).  The most decisive step in this process was taken during 
9 the restructuring of the  state  companies.  Under  the Law  of  21  March  1991, 
Belgacom 4,  the  Belgian  Post  Office  and  the  National  Railway  Company 
(SNCB /NMBS) were transformed into autonomous state companies.  The condi-
tions under which autonomous state companies fulfil the tasks of a public service 
have since been laid down in a management contract between the government and 
the  company.  In  this  contract,  the  government  undertakes  to  provide  the 
necessary resources and to guarantee the required management scope.  The state 
company undertakes to carry out, within an agreed period of time, clearly defined 
public  service  tasks.  The  Law of  21  March  1991  therefore  creates  room  for 
manoeuvre, by demarcating an area in which the state companies can operate 
under their own responsibility. 
The state companies now have considerable scope to make 'first-order' strategic 
choices: decisions about their purpose, mission and the range of activities they 
will be involved in (cf. Kessler and Purcell, 1996).  It is remarkable, however, that 
the principle of statutory employment survived this reform.  The recruitment of 
contractual staff remained strictly limited and is still treated as the exception to the 
statutory rule (Jacqmain, 1992).  Thus, despite the extension of the companies' 
scope for strategic decision making, the distinctive set of traditional public sector 
employment practices continues to play an important ongoing role in thedetermi-
nation of terms and conditions of employment. 
However,  this  confirmation  of statutory  employment  creates  the  mistaken 
impression that the homogeneity of the personnel regime in the public sector does 
not suffer  at all.  The  autonomous state companies were given a  number of 
instruments enabling them to develop a tailor-made statute and personnel policy. 
Specifically, the law states that all due attention should be paid to the specific 
characteristics  of  each  company  when  defining  the  statutory  regime.  The 
authority to establish the personnel statute now resides with the administrative 
bodies of the company. 
A State Companies Committee was established and invested with the authority to 
conclude collective  agreements  for  the approximately  120,000  employees  in the 
autonomous state-owned companies sector.  This Committee was intended to pro-
vide the state-owned companies with a common social base and to regulate affairs 
relating to the coherence of all autonomous state-owned companies (Brynaert, 1994). 
The government's intention was thus to create a 'third pillar' in the Belgian system 
of industrial relations (Damar, 1992), since the collective agreements concluded by 
the State Companies Committee are meant to be independent of the conventions 
As part of what is  called 'strategic consolidation', shares in Belgacom were  offered  to the 
private sector in 1995. 
10 agreed upon within the Joint Committee for all public services, as well as  of the 
interprofessional agreements entered into by the employers and employees in the 
private sector. 
All that has happened thus far  in 1996,  however, is  that the chairman of this 
Committee has been appointed.  There is  no question of a  common social base. 
Consequently, the decentralisation of collective bargaining has been fairly extensive. 
A specific personnel statute has been negotiated at the level of each individual state-
owned company.  This has resulted in a number of significant changes which fit in 
closely with the shifts which have occurred in numerous other European public 
sectors (Richards, 1990; European Industrial Relations Review 233,1993): 
- despite the perpetuation of the principle of statutory employment, wider oppor-
tunities now exist for recruiting personnel by contract under conditions which 
are comparable to those in the private sector.  Increasingly, public managers are 
being recruited from the private sector; 
- more jobs higher up the career ladder are now open to external recruitment.  An 
internal labour market is still in place, but it  is now less closed; 
- the structure of the career system in levels, grades and ranks has been main-
tained in the respective companies, but has to some extent been simplified.  This 
enhances functional flexibility and makes the career paths easier to control; 
- performance evaluation now carries more weight in selection decisions.  This 
leaves room for more tailor-made and fewer off-the-peg decisions.  In addition, 
performance bonus experiments have been introduced as a means of strength-
ening the pay performance linkage (compare OECD, 1993; 1995b).  In the civil 
services, similar systems of staff appraisal are planned to take effect from 1997 
for the top two levels and from 1998 for the lower ones. 
4.  The loophole: subsidiarisation 
The trade unions are conscious of the fact that the reform process will not stop at the 
decentralised  renegotiation of the statutory regulations.  It is  especially  the far-
reaching  divisionalisation  projects  currently  being  planned  by  the  state-owned 
companies which are causing concern among the trade unions.  First, there is the 
fear  that  the  divisionalisation  will  push  the  decentralisation  of  the  collective 
bargaining  even  further.  Secondly,  the  contractualisation  of  the  employment 
relationship  comes  back  onto  the  agenda  in  the  wake  of  the  divisionalisation 
projects.  In order to explain both points, we once again outline the process as it is 
taking place in the sector of the state enterprises. 
11 Further decentralisation of  collective bargaining 
There have been important similarities in the organisational forms  which have 
emerged across the sector of the state companies.  Each of the companies has been 
broken down into smaller, quasi-autonomous units.  This has been presented as 
involving a  delegation of responsibilities  for  the resources  needed  to  provide 
services, with 'the centre', variously defined, retaining a strategic, co-ordinating 
and controlling role  . 
•  In July 1995 Belgacom launched the so-called TURBO Plan.  Belgacom was split 
into divisions, which each enjoy a  large measure of independence and take 
responsibility for their own costs and revenues.  Previously, the organisational 
structure made up of 13 districts was but a reflection of the central organisation, 
with a general directorate and a wide range of specialised directorates for tech-
nical, commercial, financial and social areas.  At the centre of the Turbo-plan is 
the  creation  of  three  divisions,  each  fully  responsible  for  a  specific 
product/market-combination, developing its  own repair services  as  well as 
separate telephone shops, and therefore more able to respond to  differential 
market pressures: the 'corporate' division, the 'business' division (SMEs)  and 
the 'residential' division.  Their autonomy is gradually becoming so great that 
they can be viewed as mini-companies, be it within the contours of the parent 
company. 
•  The Post Office has also been gripped by enthusiasm for  unit management. 
Since 1994 there has been an effort to gradually 'decentralise the entrepreneur-
ship'  within  the  organisation.  Staff  functions  such  as  purchasing,  sales, 
marketing, personnel policy, etc.,  are gradually shifting from the top to  the 
units.  This transition to unit management is accompanied by a more product-
oriented division of activities.  Separate units are being set up for  philately, 
express post, letter post and financial post.  Each unit is responsible for its own 
products or services.  In so doing, the aim is to bring about more one-to-one 
relationships between those who develop the services, those who have to run 
the services, and those who ultimately sell the services. 
•  The railway company is also striving towards divisionalisation.  The reorgani-
sation boils down to division into business units managing the infrastructure 
and other units running the infrastructure.  This distinction is in line with the 
spirit of EC Directive 91/440, which requires all European railway companies to 
distinguish between infrastructure and operation.  It is the directive of the free 
market, designed to allow any carrier to appropriate the right to purchase a 
train and some carriages and to make use of the infrastructure created by the 
member states. 
12 The  emergence  of  multidivisional  or  M form  organisational  structures 
(Williamson, 1983) has been explicitly informed by foreign competitors' practices. 
This is most clearly evident when we compare the 'new Belgacom' with the other 
European telecom companies, such as  British Telecom.  Britain was originally 
divided  into  27  districts.  The  district  authorities  enjoyed  a  high  degree  of 
autonomy.  Then, in 1991, these districts were pushed aside to make way for three 
business units.  Each of these units was aimed at a specific user group.  A similar 
movement can be observed in Italy, for example.  In the case of the Italian SIP the 
abolition of zones was followed by a reorganisation of market areas following the 
new users' subdivisions by product/market (large users, users' systems, residen-
tial users, public telephones)  (Negrelli and Treu,  1993).  The reorganisation of 
telecom operations in Germany and in the Netherlands reveals a similar profile. 
The Dutch PTT Telecom divided its organisation into five business units back in 
1989,  each  unit  specialising  in  a  well-defined  product/market  combination: 
national  network,  international  telecommunications,  business  communications, 
residential market and telematics services. 
Divisionalisation and organisational decentralisation are considered indispen-
sable  to  be  service  and  cost  competitive  with  other  European  companies. 
Although the idea of divisions becoming each other's customers is  a  dramatic 
break with the past, nevertheless the trade unions are also convinced that a certain 
divisionalisation is necessary in order to have a strong position in the liberalised 
markets.  But  it  is  the  impact  of  'second-order'  decision-making  related  to 
organisational forms, on 'third-order'decisions concerning employment relations 
which worries trade unions more (d. Kessler and Purcell, 1996).  There remains 
considerable uncertainty about the effects, arising from a much looser organisation 
structure, on such items as pay, working hours, personnel evaluation and general 
working conditions (Pirlot, 1995).  The discussion is tending to concentrate on two 
dimensions: the impact of organisational decentralisation on the personnel deci-
sions and on collective bargaining. 
Firstly, the choice of role for the personnel function remains very much 'up for 
grabs' in the 'fragmented' state companies.  It is presently uncertain to what extent 
personnel management issues  will be viewed as  strategic  and handled  at the 
corporate level, or operational, and handled at the unit level.  There are forces 
seeking  to  drive  personnel  management issues  from  the  corporate  level  and 
towards line management control.  As in all situations thus far dominated by good 
centralised industrial relations, here too the trade unions fear that greater discre-
tion on personnel issues shall weaken worker representation within the company 
itself. 
Secondly, it is not inconceivable that collective bargaining will increasingly be 
shifted from the national to  the unit level  as  the M form structure is  created. 
13 Moreover, there  remains considerable uncertainty about the  responses  of unit 
managers to  a  possible increase in the  discretion to  bargain at the unit level: 
whether they will take advantage of this  discretion or continue to be party to 
multi-unit agreements.  A glance at comparable companies abroad shows us that 
such a  devolution of bargaining responsibilities  to  units or divisions  only has 
taken place  in Sweden  (Wise,  1993),  the  Netherlands  (EIRR,  1992)  and  Great 
Britain (Negrelli and Treu, 1993 on British Telecom; Ferner, 1994 on the Post Office 
and British Rail).  In Britain, there is a trend towards the fragmentation of national 
agreements  and  the  development of local  bargaining arrangements.  In local 
government, authorities are seeking greater discretion within the national frame-
work.  In the health service the prospect of local bargaining emerged from the 
decision to create an internally managed market, with purchasing of health care by 
district health authorities and fund-holders separated from the provision of health 
services undertaken by hospitals and community units  (Bach  and Winchester, 
1994).  In the civil service it arose from the decision to establish 'executive agen-
cies' (Bailey, 1994), with considerable management autonomy over pay and condi-
tions. 
The experiences in the Netherlands, Sweden and especially Great Britain with 
such decentralisation of collective bargaining to the level of separate divisions have 
certainly not given evidence of unqualified success.  Decentralisation may bring to 
an end the notion of the 'unified career bureaucracy' (Corby, 1991; Ferner, 1994) 
and,  paradoxically,  discourage  mobility  between  different  units  or  divisions. 
Besides, there is often tension between the central financial departments (common 
services) on the one hand, which want to maintain maximum control over the 
global budget for the purposes of making savings, and the local negotiators on the 
other hand, whose task is precisely that of gearing their human resources strate-
gies towards more market-oriented remuneration methods (Kinnie, 1991).  In spe-
cific cases, some rather remarkable differences have been recorded between sepa-
rate units, which are difficult to justify (Wise, 1993).  Where trade union presence 
is  strong,  decentralisation means that even more can be pocketed.  The weak 
become even weaker.  Finally, decentralisation may leave its mark on the pattern 
of conflicts.  Strikes become more whimsical and chaotic (Negrelli and Treu, 1993). 
This is not only because of decentralisation as such, but also because of the con-
comitant loss of authority of the central trade union bodies. 
Contractualisation of the employment relationship 
Parallel to the divisionalisation processes a shift 'from statute to contract' can be 
observed.  The Belgacom and the SNCB /NMBS plans in particular are followed 
especially keenly by the trade unions.  In the medium to long term, the railway 
company intends to transform itself into a holding company, an umbrella covering 
14 an extensive network of companies in which the private sector is also expected to 
participate.  A holding company of this kind is a divisionalised structure, but the 
cement between the divisions is extremely brittle.  In a holding structure, the co-
ordination centre's control over the  divisions  is  often weak and  unsystematic 
(Williamson, 1983).  The weaker the cement, the greater the chance that divisions 
of the parent company today will become separate companies tomorrow.  In addi-
tion, this form of divisionalisation facilitates the influx of private capital, since it 
makes it possible to separate profitable activities from less attractive ones.  Such 
creeping privatisation is  made possible  under  the  aforementioned  Law  of 21 
March 1991  (Deom, 1992).  The law makes provision for the possibility of setting 
up subsidiary companies, thus making room for a number of hitherto unknown 
synergies between private and public-sector partners. 
The  transformation from  divisions  into  subsidiary companies causes trouhle 
among trade unions for the future of the personnel employed in subsidiary com-
panies is  uncertain.  The law of 21  March 1991  says nothing about the system 
(statute or contract) under which that persollilel is  to be recruited or deployed 
(Jacqmain, 1992).  The creation of subsidiaries is,  in that sense, a legal loophole 
through which state companies can escape from the statutory rules of the internal 
labour market (e.g. security of employment).  We take the case of Belgacom as an 
example.  Two divisions have been transformed into fully-fledged subsidiaries. 
First,  the much talked-of  Belgacom  Mobile,  the mobile  telephone  operator in 
which Air Touch has a 24.99% participating interest.  Secondly, there is Belgacom 
Directory Services which markets the telephone directories.  Staff in these subsidi-
ary companies are, by definition, recruited under labour contracts.  Staff crossing 
over from the parent company to the subsidiary are in a different situation.  They 
can stay  with their  original  Belgacom  statute  for  a  maximum  of  two  years. 
Anyone wishing to keep that statute after two years must go back to the parent 
company.  Those wishing to stay in the subsidiary have their employment rela-
tionship contractualised. 
5.  The alternative: internal flexibility, external rigidity 
The processes of subsidiarisation, creeping privatisation and contractualisation 
put pressure on the existing  division of labour within the trade unions.  The 
present 'division of labour' between the member federations  of the respective 
trade  unions  is  to  a  large  extent  determined  by  the  conventional  difference 
between the public and the private sectors, while the boundaries between the two 
are becoming very blurred and increasing numbers of state company divisions are 
crossing the line (Van Gyes et aL, 1994).  From this point of view it is fully com-
15 prehensible that the trade unions attempt to consolidate the existing organisa-
tional structures and statutory principles. 
Nevertheless, one should dare to inquire whether the public servant's job is still 
special enough to warrant any special legal position.  The rather archaic oath-
taking ceremony is  meant to  impress on him that, as  a  representative  of the 
general interest, he is  expected to lay his self-interest aside.  The public servant 
does not work for the state - he serves the State (Camu, 1937; Molitor, 1974).  The 
state has since lost much of its sacred character.  Furthermore, it is clear that the 
work being done in state-owned companies differs only slightly from the work 
done in certain private companies.  In an increasing number of activities, state 
companies are even competing with private companies. 
Moreover, the increased  impact of collective  bargaining in determining  the 
personnel statutes in certain branches of the public sector rather takes the steam 
out of the special status of the public servant.  Within the autonomous state com-
panies for example, the autonomy of the administrative bodies in establishing the 
personnel statutes is limited by collective bargaining.  It is the joint committee 
which has the power to establish the statute.  This involvement of joint bodies in 
defining the statutes may be surprising, since we stated earlier that the statutory 
appointment  differs  from  the  contractual  relationship  precisely  in  that the 
government can unilaterally determine the terms and conditions of employment. 
The greater role of collective bargaining in defining the statutes departs from this 
principle.  In the autonomous state companies,  an unusual mixture has been 
brewed from two principles of legal position: negotiated statutes 5. 
The differences between statute and contract become blurred.  This is the result of 
two converging tendencies.  On the one hand, collective agreements set bounds to 
the freedom of individual contracting and subject the market-rational action of the 
parties on the private labour market to binding regulation (St'reeck, 1992).  In many 
cases the labour contract is reduced to an entry document that does not always offer 
much room for negotiation.  On the other hand, the aspect of unilateral establish-
ment of the terms of employment by the government is being put into perspective 
by the increasing participation of the public sector trade unions in working out the 
terms of employment.  This blurring has taken place in numerous European coun-
tries.  The doctrine of state sovereignty suffered erosion during the 1980s in coun-
tries such as France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (Ferner, 1994; Treu, 1987). 
For these reasons, a contractualisation of the employment relationship in certain 
public services should not be a  problem, although trade unions may not view 
We must remember that this is still a long way from the basic 'autonomy of will' as experienced 
by the contracting parties in the private sector.  The state company and the trade unions only 
negotiate a general ruling that applies to all members joining the statute. 
16 things so rosily.  Much more important than the difference between 'statutory' and 
'contractual' is the intended degree of numerical flexibility.  Contractualisation is 
no real threat until it is synonymous with an increase in atypical employment or a 
radical relaxation of dismissal procedures.  It is  precisely the Belgian Govern-
ment's singularly poor reputation in terms of atypical employment which has 
destroyed the calmness of the debate on the future  of statutory employment. 
Analyses of the Labour Force Survey (Table 2)  show that the volume of temporary 
work has assumed vast proportions (Sels, 1996). 
Table 2.  Estimated likelihood of temporary employment  6. 
Blue collar  White collar  Public sector 
Education  Age  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
PE  14-29  8.46  12.95  7.20  11.14  13.19  19.70 
30+  1.22  5.91  0.67  3.18  2.32  10.32 
HSE  14-29  5.02  9.56  6.74  12.53  16.55  28.21 
30+  1.95  6.92  0.97  3.55  1.51  5.42 
HE  14-29  10.25  18.51  7.48  13.87  16.96  28.92 
30+  3.76  8.37  1.31  3.00  1.88  4.28 
Table 2 presents the statistical likelihood of the population of blue-collar workers, 
white-collar workers and public servants being in temporary employment.  The 
high risk of temporary employment especially for young public sector employees 
is particularly striking.  The risk is higher in the public sector than for  private 
sector blue-collar and white-collar workers regardless of their level of education. 
In this sense, the figures have a demystifying effect.  The public sector offers no 
guarantee for employment security right down the line, rather the opposite. 
Contractualisation all too often means a significant increase in the volume of 
temporary employment.  The use of temporary employment was initially moti-
vated by the need to recruit staff for temporary tasks.  It was stimulated by the 
introduction of unemployment absorption programmes and was accelerated by 
the blocking and deceleration of statutory appointment as part of budget savings. 
Non-statutory employment formulae were devised which directed a huge number 
of unemployed people towards the public sector.  Some public services thus ended 
This Table is the result of log-linear analyses of factor response models, applied to the results of 
the 1992 Labour Force Survey.  The variables used are status (blue-collar worker, white-collar 
worker, government official), sex, age, educational level (PE =  primary education; HSE =  higher 
secondary education; HE = higher education). 
17 up with more temporary than statutory staff,  producing atrociously high staff 
turnover (Van de Velde, 1992). 
The fact is that unemployment would have reached catastrophic proportions 
without the considerable growth of the public sector in the nineteen seventies and 
the beginning of the nineteen eighties (Delperee, 1990).  Both young recruits and 
the government have paid a  high price for  this employment support.  For the 
government this  has  led  to  a  collapse  of public  finances,  whereas the young 
recruits have seen employment security being replaced with temporary, uncertain 
contracts (Gevers, 1989).  These newcomers stand outside the walls of the internal 
labour market since, as contractual staff, they are not eligible to compete for inter-
nal promotion. 
As long as contractualisation remains synonymous with an increase of atypical 
employment  and  uncertainty,  the  trade  unions'  attempts  to  consolidate  the 
existing statutory rules are perfectly comprehensible.  In the public sector, atten-
tion must therefore be focused primarily on a debate concerning the functions of 
stable employment relations. Traditionally, there are two opposing points of view 
on this issue.  The first assumes that the slowness with which production structures 
adapt is related to excessive regulations and contractual rigidity.  The second puts 
more emphasis on the operation of internal labour markets and maintains that not 
only the employees and trade unions, but also the employers, can benefit from stable 
employment relations (Biichtemann and Neumann, 1990).  Two different strategies 
for creating flexibility follow from these two different points of view. 
The first strategy aims at achieving a far-reaching degree of numerical flexibility. 
The other side of the coin with this approach is that to fill job positions, the required 
skills have to be purchased directly on the external labour market.  This can admit-
tedly be advantageous in certain markets (Lutz, 1987).  Thus this 'direct purchasing' 
is  feasible in recruiting for positions requiring low-level skills, as well as for true 
professions.  Indeed, in the latter case there is a corresponding professional market 
in which the required skills are available on a more or less 'ready-made' basis.  On 
the other hand, the creation of numerical flexibility usually offers a solution only to 
the need for volume flexibility.  It can even give rise to new rigidities.  Problems 
arise mainly once these bought-in skills need to be adapted to qualitative changes 
in jobs (Buttler, 1990).  Employers who continuously alter the skill mix of their 
staff by flexible hire and fire techniques seem to find it more difficult to achieve a 
balance between available skills and rapidly-changing skill requirements.  Boyer 
(1993,96) therefore ventures to conclude, albeit with a measure of caution, that job 
tenure or employment inertia may be an inducement to organisational flexibility. 
The second strategy implies that companies themselves take care of developing 
the needed skills.  This can be achieved by means of a targeted training policy or a 
career policy that enables employees to be given a succession of positions requiring 
18 increasingly higher skills.  This strategy is therefore aimed at the development of 
internal labour markets.  It  offers a greater adaptive capacity for internal change.  In 
this sense, it expands the possibilities for designing production processes in such a 
way that they take on the characteristics of inherent flexibility.  Even when the 
operational flexibility is thus increased, there is a need for the flexible allocation of 
personnel.  However, this flexibility does not derive from a changeable work force, 
but rather from fluctuations in working time, high internal mobility, multifunction-
ality, active retraining, etc.  The aim is therefore to achieve a higher level of internal 
(temporal and functional) flexibility, be it in combination with external (contractual) 
rigidity.  The price which may possibly have to be paid for this gain is a lower level 
of volume flexibility. 
However, we must not overstate the adaptability of internal markets.  There are 
limits to this adaptation capacity.  Dramatic organisational changes often collide 
with the limited degree of mobility among internal staff.  This happens because 
the rules of the internal market can become fossilised  over time.  Our position 
therefore requires some qualification.  Internal markets can enhance the adapt-
ability of organisations, but only under certain conditions (Lutz, 1993).  This is where 
public sector employing organisations traditionally feel the pinch.  Their internal 
labour markets have silted up.  External and internal rigidities pile up and have a 
cumulative effect. 
The trade unions' collective pressure for maintenance of all the existing statutory 
rules consolidates the existing rigidities.  An alternative option is  to defend the 
employment  security  (external  rigidity)  vigorously  while  at  the  same  time 
accepting a relaxation of the mechanisms of the internal labour market (internal 
flexibility).  Under certain conditions, high internal flexibility in combination with 
external rigidity, can serve as a functional equivalent for external flexibility com-
bined with internal rigidity (Streeck, 1992). 
6.  Conclusion 
The efforts at restructuring which are taking place in the public sector have far-
reaching effects on industrial relations and personnel policy.  This is most dearly 
evident  in  the  sector  of  the  state-owned  companies.  Collective  bargaining 
procedures  have  been  adapted  (decentralisation).  The  same  holds  for  career 
structures, recruitment procedures, pay performance linkages and staff appraisal 
systems.  For  the  time  being,  the  statutory  legal  position  is  surviving  this 
(r)evolution.  The expected assimilation of labour exchange techniques from the 
private sector and the public sector has not as yet been achieved.  This does not 
detract  from  the  fact  that increasingly fewer  employees are being protected by 
19 statutory employment.  In the state-owned companies sector, the contractualisation 
is rather being accelerated under the influence of subsidiarisation processes. 
In the conclusion of this contribution, we have discussed in detail the contro-
versy concerning what the proper technique is  for  regulating the employment 
relationship: contract or statute.  The differences between the two are in fact 
becoming increasingly blurred.  The problem is rather that contractualisation in 
the public sector turns out to be synonymous with a substantial increase of tempo-
raryemployment.  Hence there is a greater need for a debate concerning the func-
tions of stable employment relations and the types of activities which do or do not 
benefit from an increase in numerical flexibility.  We have emphasised that the 
proper operation of many public services is benefited precisely by a certain exter-
nal rigidity, in any case when accompanied by an increase in the internal flexi-
bility. 
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